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I. INTRODUCTION
In Texas, imposition of the death penalty requires a jury determination that 
the defendant is likely to be dangerous in the future.1 A six/two majority of the 
Supreme Court held, in Buck v. Davis,2 that defense counsel was ineffective in 
presenting an expert witness who concluded that Duane Buck was unlikely to be a 
danger in the future but also reported that Buck was more likely to be dangerous 
EHFDXVH KH LV EODFN  3ULRU WR WKH 6XSUHPH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ D VWRUP RI SXEOLF
protest accompanied the case,3 and the oral argument made clear that the lower 
FRXUW¶VUHIXVDOWRUHYHUVH%XFN¶VFRQYLFWLRQZRXOGEHRYHUWXUQHG4
Because most of my scholarly work focuses on race in the criminal process, 
and because I am a capital defense attorney, the reader may be surprised that I 
DJUHH ZLWK WKH GLVVHQWLQJ RSLQLRQ RI -XVWLFH 7KRPDV WKDW ³>K@DYLQJ VHWWOHG RQ D
desired outcome, the Court bulldozes procedural obstacles and misapplies settled 
ODZ WR MXVWLI\ LW´5 , DOVR DJUHH ZLWK 7KRPDV WKDW ³>WKH] decision has few 
UDPLILFDWLRQVLIDQ\EH\RQGWKHKLJKO\XQXVXDOIDFWVSUHVHQWHGKHUH´6 But unlike 
Justice Thomas, I do not view the sharply limited precedential value of the 
GHFLVLRQDVLWV³RQHXSVLGH´7 but rather as its deeply regrettable downside.
I have no doubt that the outcome of Buck is correct.  Nor do I doubt that in 
RQHVHQVHDV%XFN¶VRSHQLQJEULHIVWDWHG8 and the majority opinion declares,9 the 
FDVHLV³H[WUDRUGLQDU\´%XWLQVHYHUDOLPSRUWDQWVHQVHVWKHLQMXVWLFHVHPERGLHGLQ
%XFN¶V trial are all too ordinary, and Buck leaves untouched those ordinary 

 The James and Mark Flanagan Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, and Assistant 
Director, Cornell Death Penalty Project.
1 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071 
(2017).
2 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017).
3 Linda Geffin, Sentenced to Death Because He Is Black: Grant Duane Buck a New 
Hearing!, CHANGE.ORG, https://www.change.org/p/sentenced-to-death-because-he-is-black-grant-
duane-buck-a-new-hearing [https://perma.cc/SQX7-GEUQ] (showing 94,121 supporters who signed 
the petition) (last visited Aug. 28, 2017).
4 Transcript of Oral Argument, Buck, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (No. 15-8049).
5 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 780±81 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
6 Id. at 781.
7 Id.
8 Brief for Petitioner at 3, Buck, 137 S. Ct. 759 (No. 15-8049).
9 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 778 (majority opinion).
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injustices.  I write to protest those routine, unpublicized injustices, and to lament 
WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VXQZLOOLQJQHVVWRH[DPLQHWKHP
Below, I first describe the case at trial and trace its history in the lower courts.  
Next, I summarize the Supreme Court opinions, perhaps giving shorter shrift to the 
procedural issues than is their due, and certainly shorter shrift than Justice Thomas 
would insist is appropriate.  Then putting aside procedural issues, I focus on 
substantive doctrines in three areas that the opinion in Buck largely skips over: 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the future dangerousness determination, and the 
pervasive influence of racial bias in Texas death penalty cases.
II. BUCK V. DAVIS: THE CASE, THE BACKGROUND, AND THE DECISION
A. The Case at Trial
'XDQH%XFN¶V FULPHZDV QRW D V\PSDWKHWLF RQH10 After breaking into the 
home of Debra Gardner, his former girlfriend, Buck encountered an acquaintance, 
Harold Ebenezer, at whom he shot but missed; his own stepsister, Phyllis Taylor, 
ZKRP KH VKRW DQG ZRXQGHG DQG *DUGQHU¶V IULHQG .HQQHWK %XWOHU ZKRP KH
killed.11 He then chased Gardner into the street, shooting and killing her in front of 
her children as they pleaded for her life.12 In the aftermath of the crime, Buck 
displayed no remorse; he taunted Gardner as she lay dying,13 and smiled and 
laughed as police drove away.14
7KH6WDWHVRXJKWGHDWK%XFN¶VJXLOWZDVQHYHUGLVSXWHGVRWKHRQO\TXHVWLRQ
was penalty.  In Texas, unlike all other states but Virginia15 and Oregon,16 capital 
sentencing focuses on future dangerousness.  To impose a death sentence, a 
unanimous jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant is likely 
to commit future acts of criminal violence if sentenced to life imprisonment.17
Then the jury must consider any mitigating evidence proffered by the defendant.
7RHVWDEOLVK%XFN¶V IXWXUHGDQJHURXVQHVV LQDGGLWLRQ WR WKHHYLGHQFHRI WKH
crime, the State offered testimony by a former girlfriend regarding his repeated 
physical abuse and threats,18 proof of his conviction of delivery of cocaine and 

10 A longer version of the crime, which contains additional aggravating details, may be found 
LQWKH6WDWH¶V%ULHISee Brief for Respondent at 1±6, Buck, 137 S. Ct. 759 (No. 15-8049).
11 Id.
12 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 767.
13 Id. at 783 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 768 (majority opinion).
15 VA. CODE § 19.2-264.2 (2017).
16 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (2015).
17 See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.071 
(2017).
18 Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 6±7.
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unlawfully carrying a weapon,19 DQG WHVWLPRQ\ UHJDUGLQJ *DUGQHU¶V G\LQJ
moments surrounded by her children.20 $V%XFN¶VODZ\HUVZRXOGODWHUKDUSXSRQ
and a majority of the Supreme Court would note, the State produced no evidence 
of violent behavior outside a romantic relationship.21
Defense counsel presented lay testimony from family and a pastor that Buck 
had not been violent in the past.22 The first expert the defense called was 
psychologist Patrick Lawrence, who, relying on the fact that Buck was unlikely to 
develop a romantic relationship with a woman in prison and also relying on 
UHFRUGVVKRZLQJKH³GLGQRWSUHVHQWDQ\SUREOHPVLQWKHSULVRQVHWWLQJ´concluded 
that Buck was not likely to be dangerous in the future.23 /DZUHQFH¶V WHVWLPRQ\
made no mention of race.
Defense counsel also presented psychologist, Dr. Walter Quijano, who, 
relying on the same two factors, agreed with Dr. Lawrence that Buck was unlikely 
to pose a danger in the future.24 However, in determining whether Buck was likely 
WRSRVHDGDQJHULQWKHIXWXUH'U4XLMDQRFRQVLGHUHGVHYHQ³VWDWLVWLFDOIDFWRUV´25
7KH UHOHYDQW SDUW RI KLV UHSRUW UHDG DV IROORZV ³ Race. Black: Increased 
probability.  There is an over-representation of Blacks among the violent 
RIIHQGHUV´26 'HIHQVHFRXQVHODVNHG4XLMDQRWRGLVFXVVWKH³VWDWLVWLFDOIDFWRUV´KH
KDG³ORRNHGDW LQ UHJDUG WR WKLV FDVH´ WRZKLFK ³4XLMDQR UHVSRQGHG WKDW FHUWDLQ
factors, including UDFH ZHUH µNQRZ>Q@ WR SUHGLFW IXWXUH GDQJHURXVQHVV¶´27 He 
FRQWLQXHG³,W¶VDVDGFRPPHQWDU\WKDWPLQRULWLHV+LVSDQLFVDQGEODFNSHRSOH
DUH RYHU UHSUHVHQWHG LQ WKH &ULPLQDO -XVWLFH 6\VWHP´28 In response to the 
SURVHFXWRU¶V TXHVWLRQ RQ FURVV-examination, ³You have determined that the sex 
IDFWRU WKDWDPDOHLVPRUHYLROHQWWKDQDIHPDOHEHFDXVHWKDW¶VMXVW WKHZD\LW LV
and that the race factor, black, increases the future dangerousness for various 
FRPSOLFDWHGUHDVRQVLVWKDWFRUUHFW´4XLMDQRUHSOLHG³<HV´29
7KHMXU\DVNHGWRVHH4XLMDQR¶VUHSRUWGXULQJLWVGHOLEHUDWLRQVDQGXOWLPDWHO\
found that Buck was likely to be dangerous in the future and sentenced him to 
death.30 His conviction and death sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.31

19 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 6.
20 Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 7.
21 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 776 (2017).  But see id. at 782±83 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(disputing this characterization of the killings based on the fact that Buck shot at three people with 
whom he was not romantically involved).
22 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 8, at 6.
23 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 768.
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 769.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
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B. Post-Conviction Litigation
Buck filed his first petition for a writ of habeas corpus in Texas state court in 
 DGYDQFLQJ IRXU FODLPV DOO RI ZKLFK ZHUH ³IULYRORXV RU QRQFRJQL]DEOH´32
7KHSHWLWLRQGLGQRWDGGUHVVWKHDGHTXDF\RIGHIHQVHFRXQVHO¶VUHSUHVHQWation.
7KDW VDPH \HDU ZKLOH %XFN¶V ILUVW SHWLWLRQ ZDV SHQGLQJ DQRWKHU FDVH
LQYROYLQJ 4XLMDQR¶V WHVWLPRQ\ WKDW RI 9LFWRU 6DOGDQR UHDFKHG WKH 6XSUHPH
Court.33 6DOGDQR DUJXHG WKDW KLV GHDWK VHQWHQFH ZDV WDLQWHG E\ 4XLMDQR¶V
WHVWLPRQ\ WKDW 6DOGDQR¶V /DWLQR ethnicity weighed in favor of future 
dangerousness.34 The Buck majority states without elaboration that Texas 
FRQIHVVHGHUURUDQGUHTXHVWHGWKDWWKH&RXUWWRJUDQW6DOGDQR¶VSHWLWLRQYDFDWHWKH
state court judgment, and remand the case²and that the Court did so.35 The reader 
who wonders why Texas confessed error only when the case reached the Supreme 
Court finds no answer in Buck but might consider whether the fact that George W. 
Bush, then the governor of Texas, was running for President at that time affected 
7H[DV¶VGHFLVLRQWRFRQIHVVHUURU
Whatever the reason for the concession, it was followed only days later by 
then-7H[DV$WWRUQH\*HQHUDO -RKQ&RUQ\Q¶V DQQRXQFHPHQW WKDW VL[ RWKHU FDSLWDO
cases²LQFOXGLQJ %XFN¶V²were possibly tainted by race-related testimony from 
Quijano.36 (YHQWXDOO\ &RUQ\Q ³FRQIHVVHG HUURU ZDLY>LQJ@ DQ\ DYDLODEOH
procedural defenses, and consented to resentencing in the cases of five of those six 
GHIHQGDQWV´37 %XFN¶VZDVWKHH[FHSWLRQ38
³>7@KH7H[DV$WWRUQH\*HQHUDOUHSUHVHQWVVtate respondents in federal habeas 
FDVHV EXW QRW VWDWH KDEHDV FDVHV´ FRQVHTXHQWO\ ZKHQ %XFN ILOHG D VXFFHVVLYH
petition in state court alleging ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the 
LQWURGXFWLRQRI4XLMDQR¶VWHVWLPRQ\WKHGHFLVLRQWRFRQFHGH ZDVQRWLQ&RUQ\Q¶V
hands.39 In that proceeding, the State neither waived procedural defenses nor 
FRQIHVVHG HUURU DQG EHFDXVH%XFN¶V SHWLWLRQZDV VXFFHVVLYH LQ  WKH7H[DV
Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed it as an abuse of the writ.40 By the time Buck 

31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id. (referencing Saldano v. Texas, 50 U.S. 1212 (2000)).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 OFFICE OF THE TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATEMENT FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN 
CORNYN REGARDING DEATH PENALTY CASES, (June 9, 2000), https://texasattorneygeneral.gov
/newspubs/newsarchive/2000/20000609death.htm [https://perma.cc/5WUF-FWQV].
37 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 770.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Id.; see Ex parte Buck, Nos. WR-57,004-01, WR-57,004-02 (Tex. Crim. App., Oct. 15, 
2003) (per curiam).
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filed his petition for habeas corpus in federal district court, Cornyn was no longer 
Attorney General, and the new Attorney General asserted procedural default as a 
EDUULHU WRUHDFKLQJ WKHPHULWVRI%XFN¶VLQHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHOFODLP41
In 2006, a federal district court agreed that the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim was procedurally defaulted and therefore unreviewable.42
7KHQLQ³%XFNVRXJKWWRUHRSHQWKDWMXGJPHQWE\ILOLQJDPRWLRQ
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6)´43 He argued that the Supreme 
&RXUW¶VVXEVHTXHQWGHFLVLRQVLQMartinez v. Ryan and Trevino v. Thaler created the 
³H[WUDRUGLQDU\FLUFXPVWDQFHV´UHTXLUHGWRMXVWLI\UHRSHQLQJDMXGJPHQWXQGHUWKH
rule.44 Broadly speaking, Martinez and Trevino, taken together, permit federal 
habeas petitioners in Texas to litigate the merits of an otherwise defaulted 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel when they can show that state post-
conviction counsel were ineffective in failing to raise that claim.45 %XFN¶VPRWLRQ
LGHQWLILHG WHQ DGGLWLRQDO IDFWRUV WKDW KH VDLG FRQWULEXWHG WR WKH ³H[WUDRUGLQDU\
FLUFXPVWDQFHV´UHTXLUHGWRMXVWLI\UHRSHQLQJDMXGJPHQWXQGHU5XOHE46
³7KH'LVWULFW&RXUW GHQLHGWKHPRWLRQDQGWKH)Lfth Circuit declined to 
LVVXHWKHFHUWLILFDWHRIDSSHDODELOLW\&2$´²Buck needed to appeal that decision;
Buck petitioned for, and was granted, certiorari.47 Seven amicus briefs, including 
one from former prosecutors, were filed in support of the petitioner;48 none were 
filed in support of the respondent.  Numerous editorials49 and public figures,50
including former Texas Governor Mark White,51 and Linda Geffin,52 one of the 

41 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 770.
42 Id. at 767.
43 Id.
44 Id.; see Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012); Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013). 
45 Martinez, 566 U.S. at 17; Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921. 
46 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 767. 
47 Id.
48 For a list of the amici briefs, see SCOTUSBLOG, BUCK V. DAVIS, (Mar. 27, 2017), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/buck-v-stephens/ [https://perma.cc/S7Z3-QAN7]; see, 
e.g., Brief for Former Prosecutors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Buck, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) 
(No. 15-8049).
49 See, e.g., Gerald Kogan & Tim Cole, Opinion, Duane Buck Deserves a Color-Blind 
Sentencing Trial, WASH. POST (Oct. 2, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/duane-
buck-deserves-a-color-blind-sentencing-trial/2016/10/02/3010f396-8748-11e6-92c2-14b64f3d453f_
story.html?utm_term=.f9441af2da1d [https://perma.cc/7UVX-79HY].
50 NAACP LDF, MORE THAN 100 CIVIL RIGHTS LEADERS, ELECTED OFFICIALS, CLERGY,
FORMER PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES, PAST ABA PRESIDENTS, AND A FORMER TX GOVERNOR CALL FOR 
NEW, FAIR SENTENCING FOR DUANE BUCK (Mar. 20, 2013), http://www.naacpldf.org/news/more-100-
civil-rights-leaders-elected-officials-clergy-former-prosecutors-and-judges-current [https://perma.cc/
U7HN-PYCL].
51 Id.; Mackey Torres, Former Texas Governor Mark White Joins Others Calling for a Proper 
Sentence for Duane Buck, Since the Last One Was a Tad Bit Racist, HOUS. PRESS (Mar. 21, 2013, 
7:00 AM), http://www.houstonpress.com/news/former-texas-governor-mark-white-joins-others-
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SURVHFXWRUV ZKR WULHG %XFN¶V FDVH FDOOHG IRU D QHZ SHQDOW\ SKDVH KHDULQJ IRU
Buck.
C. The Supreme Court Opinions
,QHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFHRIFRXQVHO³,$&´
%XFN¶V UHTXHVW IRU D &2$ UDLVHG WZR TXHVWLRQV  7KH PDMRULW\ RSLQLRQ
ZULWWHQE\&KLHI-XVWLFH5REHUWV WXUQVWRWKHVXEVWDQWLYHTXHVWLRQILUVW³ZKHWKHU
reasonable jurists could dHEDWHWKH'LVWULFW&RXUW¶VFRQFOXVLRQ WKDW%XFNZDVQRW
denied his right to effective assistance of counsel under Strickland [v. 
Washington@´53 Somewhat surprisingly, the Court did not confine its answer to 
the application of the COA standard: debatability among reasonable jurists.  With 
respect to the COA standard, the Court criticized the Fifth Circuit for deciding the 
merits of the IAC issue before turning to debatability, then itself turned to the 
merits of the issue rather than remanding to the Fifth Circuit for that 
determination.54
A defendant who claims to have been denied effective assistance must show 
ERWK WKDW FRXQVHOSHUIRUPHGGHILFLHQWO\ DQG WKDWFRXQVHO¶VGHILFLHQWSHUIRUPDQFH
caused him prejudice.  Despite characterizing Strickland¶V ILUVW SURQJ DV ³DKLJK
EDU´WKHPDMRULW\GLVSHQVHVZLWKLWLQWZRSDUDJUDSKVQRWLQJILUVWWKDWWKHGLVWULFW
FRXUWKDGIRXQGWKDW³FRXQVHO¶VSHUIRUPDQFHIHOORXWVLGHWKHERXQGVRIFRPSHWHQW
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´55 Then, after naming three related deficiencies²calling Quijano 
knowing his methodology included consideration of race, eliciting testimony about 
WKH SXUSRUWHG FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ %XFN¶V UDFH DQG WKH OLNHOLKRRG RI IXWXUH
YLROHQFHDQGSXWWLQJLQWRHYLGHQFHDUHSRUWWKDWVWDWHGWKDW%XFN¶VUDFHLQFUHDVHG
his likelihood of future dangerousness²WKH PDMRULW\ FRQFOXGHV WKDW ³>Q@R
FRPSHWHQWGHIHQVHDWWRUQH\ZRXOGLQWURGXFHVXFKHYLGHQFHDERXWKLVRZQFOLHQW´56
7KH &RXUW¶V GLVFXVVLRQ RI Strickland¶V VHFRQG SURQJ SUHMXGLFH LV RQO\
slightly longer, and concludes, contrar\WRWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDWLW
was reasonably probable that the proceeding would have ended differently absent 
FRXQVHO¶VLQFRPSHWHQFH57 Initially, the Court notes that future dangerousness was 

calling-for-a-proper-sentence-for-duane-buck-since-the-last-one-was-a-tad-bit-racist-6737801 
[https://perma.cc/D5JD-NKRW].
52 NAACP LDF, supra note 50; Linda Geffin, Justices, Give Duane Buck a Second Chance,
CNN (Sept. 30, 2016 8:59 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2016/09/30/opinions/reverse-duane-buck-
sentence-geffin/index.html [https://perma.cc/Y6LR-6G56].
53 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 775 (2017) (referencing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 
668 (1984)).
54 Id. at 774±75.
55 Id. at 775.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 776.
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WKH NH\ LVVXH LQ %XFN¶V VHQWHQFLQJ DQG GHHPV LW ³DQ XQXVXDO LQTXLU\´ EHFDXVH
³>W@KH MXURUV ZHUH QRW DVNHG WR GHWHUPLQH D KLVWRULFDO IDFW FRQFHUQLQJ %XFN¶V
conduct, but to render a predictive judgment inevitably entailing a degree of 
VSHFXODWLRQ´58 According to the majority, despite the brutality oI%XFN¶V FULPH
DQG ODFN RI UHPRUVH EHFDXVH ³%XFN¶V SULRU YLROHQW DFWVKDG RFFXUUHG RXWVLGH RI
SULVRQDQGZLWKLQWKHFRQWH[WRIURPDQWLFUHODWLRQVKLSVZLWKZRPHQ´DMXU\FRXOG
conclude that a change in his situation²incarceration for life away from romantic 
involvements²³ZRXOGPLQLPL]HWKHSURVSHFWRIIXWXUHGDQJHURXVQHVV´59
%XW RQH WKLQJ ZRXOG QHYHU FKDQJH WKH FRORU RI %XFN¶V VNLQ  %XFN
would always be black.  And according to Dr. Quijano, that immutable 
FKDUDFWHULVWLF FDUULHG ZLWK LW DQ ³>L@QFUHDVHG SUREDELOLW\´ RI IXWXUH
violence.  Here was hard statistical evidence²from an expert²to guide 
an otherwise speculative inquiry.
$QG LW ZDV SRWHQW HYLGHQFH  'U 4XLMDQR¶V WHVWLPRQ\ DSSHDOHG WR D
powerful racial stereotype²WKDW RI EODFNPHQ DV ³YLROHQFH SURQH´  ,Q
FRPELQDWLRQ ZLWK WKH VXEVWDQFH RI WKH MXU\¶V LQTXLU\ WKLV FUHDWHG
VRPHWKLQJRIDSHUIHFWVWRUP'U4XLMDQR¶VRSLQLRQFRLQFLGHGSUHFLVHO\
with a particularly noxious strain of racial prejudice, which itself 
coincided precisely with the central question at sentencing.  The effect of 
this unusual confluence of factors was to provide support for making a 
decision on life or death on the basis of race.60
7KHUHIRUHDFFRUGLQJWRWKH&RXUWLWKDGWRUHMHFWWKHGLVWULFWFRXUW¶VUHDVRQLQJWKDW
because rDFHZDVRQO\PHQWLRQHGWZLFHLWZDV³de minimis´³ZKHQDMXU\KHDUV
H[SHUWWHVWLPRQ\WKDWH[SUHVVO\PDNHVDGHIHQGDQW¶VUDFHGLUHFWO\SHUWLQHQWRQWKH
question of life or death, the impact of that evidence cannot be measured simply by 
how much air time it received at trial or how many pages it occupies in the 
UHFRUG´61
-XVWLFH7KRPDV¶GLVVHQWRQ WKLV LVVXHILUVWQRWHV WKHRGGLW\RIFULWLFL]LQJ WKH
Fifth Circuit for deciding the IAC issue on the merits as part of its COA 
debatability-by-reasonable-jurists determination,62 then criticizes the majority for 
itself jumping to the merits instead of remanding that issue,63 and finally, disputes 
WKHPDMRULW\¶VFRQFOXVLRQRQWKHPHULWVRI%XFN¶V,$&FODLP7KRPDVREMHFWVWKDW
³>W@KH PDMRULW\ QHJOHFWV HYHQ WR PHQWLRQ the relevant legal standard in Texas, 

58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id. (internal citations omitted).
61 Id. at 777.
62 Id. at 781±82 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 782.
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UHO\LQJLQVWHDGRQUKHWRULFDQGVSHFXODWLRQWRFUDIWDILQGLQJRISUHMXGLFH´64 State 
law permits an inference of future dangerousness based solely on evidence of the 
heinousness of the crime, or upon evidence of the GHIHQGDQW¶V ODFN RI UHPRUVH
both of which, Thomas argues, were overwhelming.65 Consequently, he concludes 
WKDW4XLMDQR¶V¶³GHPLQLPLV´UDFLDOWHVWLPRQ\GLGQRWSUHMXGLFH%XFN66
2. Rule 60(b)(6)
For Buck to win in the Supreme Court, he not only had to prevail on the 
substantive IAC question discussed above, but also had to prevail on the Rule 
60(b)(6) procedural question decided against him by the Fifth Circuit.  According 
to the majority, the district court abused its discretion in refusing to permit Buck to 
reopen his case under Rule 60(b)(6) because its conclusion that Buck had failed to 
HVWDEOLVK ³H[WUDRUGLQDU\ FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ UHVWHG LQ ODUJH SDUW XSRQ WKH PLVWDNHQ
YLHZ WKDW 4XLMDQR¶V PHQWLRQ RI UDFH SOD\HG RQO\ D ³de minimis´ role in the 
proceeding.67
As the majority explains, that determination was wrong for the same reason 
that WKH ORZHUFRXUW¶VGHWHUPLQDWLRQWKDW%XFNKDGIDLOHGWRVKRZSUHMXGLFHIURP
WKHLQWURGXFWLRQRI4XLMDQR¶VWHVWLPRQ\ZDVZURQJ³%XWRXUKROGLQJRQSUHMXGLFH
makes clear that Buck may have been sentenced to death in part because of his 
race . . . .  [A] disturbing departure from a basic premise of our criminal justice 
V\VWHP´68 $FFRUGLQJWR&KLHI-XVWLFH5REHUWV7H[DV¶VOLWLJDWLRQFRQFHVVLRQV
in the other five Quijano casHV GHPRQVWUDWHG WKH H[WUDRUGLQDU\ QDWXUH RI%XFN¶V
FODLPUHMHFWLQJWKHFODLPWKDWWKH6WDWH¶VODFNRIUHVSRQVLELOLW\IRULQWURGXFLQJUDFH
distinguishes Buck from those other cases.69
7KH RWKHU FRPSRQHQW RI ³H[WUDRUGLQDU\ FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ WKDW WKH PDMRULW\
identifies as significant is change in the law; at the time he moved to reopen his 
case²unlike when he filed his initial petition²³DFODLPRI LQHIIHFWLYHDVVLVWDQFH
of trial counsel defaulted in a Texas post-conviction proceeding may be reviewed 
in federal court if state habeas counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to 
UDLVHLWDQGWKHFODLPKDVµVRPHPHULW¶´70 To deem that circumstance significant, 
WKHPDMRULW\QHHGHG WRDGGUHVV7H[DV¶VFRQWHQWLRQ WKDW WKHFDVHVSHUPLWWLQJVXFK
review are not retroactive, because if they are not, Buck could not possibly prevail 
on his IAC claim.  The majority sidesteps that potential roadblock by deeming the 
no-UHWURDFWLYLW\ DUJXPHQW ZDLYHG E\ WKH 6WDWH¶V IDLOXUH WR UDLVH LW HDUOLHU DQG

64 Id.
65 Id. at 782±83.
66 Id. at 782.
67 Id. at 778 (majority opinion).
68 Id.
69 Id. at 778±79.
70 Id. at 779±80 (citations omitted).
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declines to consider it.71 Holding that Martinez/Trevino DSSOLHVWR%XFN¶VFODLP
the Court explicitly reserves the question of retroactivity to any other case.72
-XVWLFH 7KRPDV¶ GLVVHQW FRPSODLQV WKDW WKH PDMRULW\ IDLOV WR DSSO\ WKH
deferential review required by 60(b)(6), and in particular, ignores prior Supreme 
&RXQW DGPRQLWLRQV WKDW WKH UHTXLVLWH ³H[WUDRUGLQDU\ FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ ³ZLOO UDUHO\
RFFXU LQ WKHKDEHDVFRQWH[W´73 :LWK UHVSHFW WR WKHPDMRULW\¶VDUJXPHQW WKDW WKH
SRWHQWLDO LQIOXHQFHRI UDFLDO ELDVFUHDWHV ³H[WUDRUGLQDU\ FLUFXPVWDQFHV´ MXVWLI\LQJ
reopening the case, Thomas points out that the cases cited by the majority are all 
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause cases, not Sixth Amendment 
5LJKW WR&RXQVHO FDVHV DQG WKDW FRQFRPLWDQWO\ ³WKH LQMXU\ WRSXEOLF FRQILGence 
derives from the fact that the government itself is discriminating against the 
GHIHQGDQW´74 )LQDOO\KHDUJXHV WKDWWKHPDMRULW\ZURQJO\GLVSDUDJHV WKH6WDWH¶V
interest in finality,75 which is particularly strong given the length of time that has 
passHGVLQFH%XFN¶VFRQYLFWLRQ
III. DEVIATIONS FROM BUSINESS AS USUAL
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, protests that ordinary application of 
established procedural and substantive doctrines normally would have thwarted 
%XFN¶V FODLPRUDW OHDVWZRXOd have garnered votes to do so from Chief Justice 
Roberts, the author of the majority opinion; they find some solace in the fact that 
Buck changes no doctrine, and therefore, will have no implications for future cases.  
,GRQRWGLVSXWHWKDWWKHPDMRULW\¶V application of procedural doctrines is unusually 
favorable.76 But in my view, that is not the problem with the Buck decision.  
Rather, the problem is that the majority opinion treats the injustices apparent in 
%XFN¶VVHQWHQFLQJDVDEHUUDWLRQDOSXUSRUWLQJ to be shocked by them, when in fact 
those injustices are intrinsic to death penalty cases, or at least death penalty cases 
involving future dangerousness determinations.

71 Id. at 780.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 784 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
74 Id.
75 Id. at 785.
76 ,QGHHGWKHRUDODUJXPHQWWUDQVFULSWVWURQJO\VXJJHVWVWKDWWKHJRDORI%XFN¶VFRXQVHOKDG
been a remand to the Fifth Circuit for a determination on the merits of the IAC claims and that she 
was surprised (albeit pleasanWO\ E\ WKH &KLHI -XVWLFH¶V ZLOOLQJQHVV WR HQWHUWDLQ WKH PHULWV RI WKDW
claim.
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A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
1. The Performance Prong
The State in its briHI ³DJUHHV WKDW WKH LQWURGXFWLRQ RI UDFH LQWR SHWLWLRQHU¶V
capital-SXQLVKPHQW SURFHHGLQJV E\ SHWLWLRQHU¶V RZQ WULDO FRXQVHO was at least 
debatably deficient performance.´77 The majority quickly accepts,78 and the 
dissent does not address, the proposition thDW WULDO FRXQVHO¶V GHFLVLRQ WR FDOO
4XLMDQRDVDZLWQHVVZDV LQFRPSHWHQW :KLOH , DJUHH WKDW FRXQVHO¶V FKRLFHZDV
appalling, and that such stupid decisions should be deemed outside the range of 
acceptable representation, it bears noting that most ineffective assistance of 
counsel cases emphasize how wide the acceptable range is;79 that great deference 
must be given to strategic choices made by counsel after adequate investigation;80
and that no hindsight is permissible in evaluating those choices.81
Of the three actions the majority deemed incompetent, at least two can easily 
be defended under these standards.  Assuming that trial counsel was going to call 
Quijano, of course KH HOLFLWHG WKH XQIDYRUDEOH ³VWDWLVWLFDO´ UDFH IDFWRU IURP WKH
witness; he was better off eliciting it himself²thereby blunting its effect²than 
allowing the prosecution to bring it out for the first time on cross-examination.  
Although one might argue that the State would be precluded from eliciting this 
factor, such an argument depends upon hindsight; trial counsel could not have 
NQRZQWKDWXQWLODIWHUWKH6WDWH¶VFRQFHVVLRQLQSaldano.82 Then, again assuming 
that Quijano was going to be called as a witness, and that the jury had heard his 
views on the increased probability of violence attrLEXWDEOH WR%XFN¶V UDFH LWZDV
QRWVXUSULVLQJWKDWWULDOFRXQVHOPRYHGWRLQWURGXFH4XLMDQR¶VUHSRUWLI4XLMDQR¶V
testimony, on balance, favored Buck, then letting the jury have access to the report
did make sense.
So we are back to one error: the decision to call Quijano, given what he had to 
VD\DERXW%XFN¶V UDFH LQFUHDVLQJ WKH OLNHOLKRRGRI IXWXUHGDQJHURXVQHVVEXWDOVR
given that he would conclude Buck was not a danger in the future.  True, counsel 
had another expert who had said that Buck was not a danger in the future, but 
wanting a second witness on the critical issue in the case²particularly given the 
brutal crime and lack of remorse, which weigh heavily against Buck on that 

77 Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 1 (emphasis added).
78 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775 (majority opinion).
79 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669, 681 (1984); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 
521±22 (2003).
80 Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 521±22.
81 Strickland 86 DW  ³-XGLFLDO VFUXWLQ\ RI FRXQVHO¶V SHUIRUPDQFHPXVW EH KLJKO\
deferential, and a fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to 
HOLPLQDWHWKHGLVWRUWLQJHIIHFWVRIKLQGVLJKWWRUHFRQVWUXFWWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVRIFRXQVHO¶VFKDOOHQJHG
FRQGXFWDQGWRHYDOXDWHWKHFRQGXFWIURPFRXQVHO¶VSHUVSHFWLYHDWWKHWLPH´
82 Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (en banc).
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issue²was not crazy.  Indeed, other Texas trial attorneys made the exact same 
decision with respect to Quijano’s testimony.83 Let me reiterate: I am not 
GHIHQGLQJWULDOFRXQVHO¶VGHFLVLRQEXWRQO\SRLQWLQJRXWWKDWLQPRVWUHDGQRWVR
highly publicized) cases, no court would so quickly deem incompetent the decision 
of trial counsel to put on a witness whose ultimate conclusion was favorable but 
whose testimony introduced a negative consideration.84 The reader who is 
skeptical that the Supreme Court treats less charged cases with far more deference 
WR FRXQVHO¶V VWUDWHJLF FKRLFHV should consider Yarborough v. Gentry,85 a per 
curiam opinion in which the Court credited truly ridiculous strategic reasons to 
redeem a closing argument rife with idiocy.86
$QRWKHU LQGLFDWLRQ RI WKH ILFNOHQHVV RI WKH &RXUW¶V LQWHUHVW LQ FRPSHWHQW
representaWLRQOLHVLQWKHRWKHUIDLOXUHVRI%XFN¶VWULDOFRXQVHOLQ%XFN¶VFDVHDQG
LQ RWKHUV  %XFN¶V WULDO FRXQVHO IDLOHG WR LQIRUP WKH MXU\ RI KLV WUDXPDWLF OLIH
history, which included surviving severe and regular beatings from his violent 
father; exposure to alcohol beginning at the age of five; exposure to prostitution as 
a child; exposure to toxic substances in an auto shop where he was forced to work 
from childhood through adulthood; the traumatic death of his mother when he was 
11 years old; his experience of life-threatening incidents as a young person, 
LQFOXGLQJ EHLQJ VKRW LQ WKH OHJ DQG XQGLDJQRVHG XQWUHDWHG $VSHUJHU¶V
Syndrome.87 7KH RSLQLRQ GRHV QRW PHQWLRQ WKH QDPH RI %XFN¶V WULDO DWWRUQH\
Jerry Guerinot, who long before this case was infamous for his terrible 
representation of capital defendants.  As New York Times reporter Adam Liptak 
SXWLW³$JRRGZD\WRHQGXSRQGHDWKURZLQ7H[DVLVWREHDFFXVHGRIDFDSLWDO
FULPHDQGKDYH-HUU\*XHULQRWUHSUHVHQW\RX´88 Guerinot was defense counsel in 

83 Brief for Respondent, supra note 10, at 10±11, 45±46.
84 See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 860 F. Supp. 2d 663, 868 (N.D. Iowa 2012) (finding no 
LQHIIHFWLYH DVVLVWDQFH RI FRXQVHO ZKHUH WKH QHJDWLYH DVSHFWV RI HDFK ZLWQHVV¶V WHVWLPRQ\ GLG QRt
outweigh the mitigating aspects); Holland v. Horn, 150 F. Supp. 2d 706, 738 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding 
no ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel allowed a witness to testify and minimize the 
SHWLWLRQHU¶V LQWR[LFDWLRQ WR SURWHFW KLPVHOI IURP SURVHFXWLRQ WKHUHE\ PLQLPL]LQJ WKH SHWLWLRQHU¶V
intoxication defense); Garcia v. State, 57 S.W.3d 436, 440±41 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) (finding trial 
FRXQVHO¶VGHFLVLRQWRFDOO4XLMDQRUHDVRQDEOH
85 Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 3±5 (2003) (per curiam).
86 $FFRUGLQJ WR WKH&RXUW FRXQVHO¶V IDLOXUH WR DGGUHVV DOO RI WKH H[FXOSDWRU\ HYLGHQFHPD\
KDYH UHIOHFWHG D VWUDWHJ\ RI ³>I@RFXVLQJ RQ D VPDOO QXPEHU RI NH\ SRLQWV >UDWKHU WKDQ WDNLQJ@ D
VKRWJXQDSSURDFK´FRXQVHO¶VPHQWLRQRIOHJDOO\LUUHOHYDQWGHWDLOVWKDWKXUWKLVFOLHQW¶VSRVLWLRQFRXOG
have been an attempt to emphasize that those factors were irrelevant, despite his characterization of 
KLVFOLHQWDVD³EDGSHUVRQORXV\GUXJDGGLFWVWLQNLQJWKLHIMDLOELUG´FRXQVHO¶VIDLOXUHWRH[SUHVVO\
ask for DQDFTXLWWDOPLJKWKDYHEHHQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHVWUDWHJ\RIQRW³FKDOOHQJLQJWKHMXU\WRILQG
IRU \RXUFOLHQW´DQGFRXQVHO¶VDFNQRZOHGJHPHQW WKDWKHFRXOGQRWEH VXUHRI WKH WUXWKFRXOGKDYH
VHUYHGDVD³UKHWRULFDOGHYLFHWKDWSHUVRQDOL]HVWKHGRXEWVDQ\RQHEXWDQH\HZLWQHVVPXVWKDYH´Id.
at 3, 7, 10±11 (citations omitted).
87 Ex parte Buck, 418 S.W.3d 98, 101, 111±12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (Alcala, J, dissenting).
88 Adam Liptak, A Lawyer Best Known for Losing Cases, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/18/us/18bar.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/5E3Y-H826].
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twenty cases in which his client received a death sentence and never represented a 
client who was spared the death penalty.89 In many of those cases he was equally 
derelict; as Professor David Dow, then-director of the Texas Defender Service 
REVHUYHG³+HGRHVQ¶WHYHQSLFNWKHORZ-hanging fruit which is hitting him in the 
KHDG DV KH¶VZDONLQJ XQGHU WKH WUHH´90 Guerinot has given up capital work but 
now takes a volume of noncapital cases so large it is impossible to imagine he 
could provide his clients adequate representation.  An analysis in the Houston 
Chronicle found that in a two-year period, Guerinot had represented 2,000 felony 
defendants.91 The Supreme Court has shown no interest in policing other Guerinot 
cases with equally inadequate²but not as sensational²incompetence.92
2. Prejudice
To the reader unfamiliar with typical IAC caVHVWKH6XSUHPH&RXUW¶VDQDO\VLV
of the prejudice prong might seem unremarkable, save perhaps for its cursoriness, 
JLYHQWKDWWKH)LIWK&LUFXLWKDGQRWDQDO\]HGWKHPHULWVRI%XFN¶V,$&FODLP7KH
district court had concluded that Buck failed to establish the reasonable likelihood 
RIDGLIIHUHQWUHVXOWDEVHQWFRXQVHO¶VHUURUVEHFDXVHWKHFULPHZDV³KRUULILF´DQG
EHFDXVHWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIUDFHZDV³GHPLQLPLV´93 DQGWKH6WDWH¶VEULHILQJRIWKH
issue in the Supreme Court emphasized both the brutality of %XFN¶VFULPHDQGKLV
lack of remorse.94 %XWDFFRUGLQJ WR WKHPDMRULW\³QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKHQDWXUHRI
%XFN¶V FULPH DQG KLV EHKDYLRU LQ WKH DIWHUPDWK´ WKH MXU\ FRXOG KDYH FRQFOXGHG
that he would not be a danger in the future because romantically motivated crimes 
would be unlikely to occur in prison.95
The dissent vigorously disputes that determination, detailing both the brutality 
RIWKHFULPHDQG%XFN¶VFRQWHPSRUDQHRXVDEVHQFHRIUHPRUVHEXWWKHPDMRULW\¶V
assessment of error is consistent with the Supreme &RXUW¶VWUHDWPHQWRISUHMXGLFH
in other successful IAC cases, several of which involved brutal crimes.96

89 Id.
90 Id. (describing his paltry efforts to defend Linda Carty).
91 Lise Olsen, Hundreds of Indigent Inmates Jailed for Months Pretrial, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 
3, 2009, 5:30 AM), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Hundreds-of-indigent-inmates-
jailed-for-months-1566415.php?plckFindCommentKey=CommentKey:73f02b7c-0c09-4141-99f0-
7fb297af8cfd [https://perma.cc/F5Z8-YL8X].
92 See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 88 (discussing the case of Linda Carty and noting the Supreme 
&RXUW¶VUHFHQWGHQLDORIFHUWLRUDUL
93 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 772 (2017).
94 See Brief for Respondent, supra note 10 at 23±27.
95 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 775.
96 Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (findiQJSUHMXGLFHDULVLQJIURPFRXQVHO¶VIDLOXUHV
despite petitioner being convicted of robbery and a brutal capital murder); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 
86ILQGLQJSUHMXGLFHDULVLQJIURPFRXQVHO¶VIDLOXUHVGHVSLWHSHWLWLRQHUEHLQJFRQYLFWHG
of brutal capital murder and robbery); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (2005) (finding prejudice 
DULVLQJIURPFRXQVHO¶VIDLOXUHVGHVSLWHSHWLWLRQHUWRUWXULQJWKHYLFWLPWRGHDWK6HDUVY8SWRQ
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However, the Fifth Circuit routinely ignores those cases and holds that brutality of 
the crime trumps any favorable evidence trial counsel failed to develop, and 
therefore precludes a finding of prejudice for that failure.97 The absence of any 
GLVFXVVLRQRIWKH)LIWK&LUFXLW¶VUHFDOFLWUDQFHRQWKLVSRLQWGRHVVXJJHVWDV-XVWLFH
7KRPDVKRSHVWKDWWKHLPSDFWRIWKHGHFLVLRQPD\ZHOOEHOLPLWHGWR%XFN¶V case.
2QHPRUH WKLQJ VKRXOG EH QRWHG DERXW WKH&RXUW¶V SUHMXGLFH DQDO\VLV 7KH
&RXUWFRQVLGHUVZKHWKHUWKHMXURUV¶FRQVLGHUDWLRQRI%XFN¶VUDFHDVDIDFWRUOLNHO\
to increase his future dangerousness was reasonably likely to alter their verdict.98
A more precise formulation of the prejudice question, however, would be one that 
IRFXVHVRQWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHLQWURGXFWLRQRI4XLMDQR¶VWHVWLPRQ\DQGUHSRUW
increased WKH OLNHOLKRRG WKDW%XFN¶V MXURUVZRXOG EH LQIOXHQFHG E\ KLV UDFH DQG
that their increased consideration of that factor would tilt them toward death.  That 
LV WKHPDMRULW\DVVXPHVDQGWKHGLVVHQWGRHVQRWTXHVWLRQWKDWDEVHQW4XLMDQR¶V
WHVWLPRQ\ WKH MXU\ZDV XQOLNHO\ WR FRQVLGHU %XFN¶V UDFH LQ DVVHVVLQJ KLV IXWXUH
dangerousness.  As I will turn to shortly, that assumption is ridiculous, but it serves 
both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas.
B. Future Dangerousness
Before I turn to the prevalence and triggering of racial prejudice, I want to 
detour to the concept of future dangerousness, in part because that detour will shed 
some light upon the race discussion.  The majority characterizes the future 
GDQJHURXVQHVV LQTXLU\ DV ERWK ³WKH NH\ LVVXH´ LQ %XFN¶V VHQWHQFLQJ DQG ³DQ
XQXVXDOLQTXLU\´EHFDXVH³>W@KHMXURUVZHUHQRWDVNHGWRGHWHrmine a historical fact 

86  ILQGLQJSUHMXGLFHDULVLQJ IURPFRXQVHO¶V IDLOXUHV GHVSLWHSHWLWLRQHU¶VEUXWDOFULPH
which included armed robbery and kidnaping with bodily injury).
97 Santellan v. Cockrell, 271 F.3d 190, 198 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that, in light of the 
GHIHQGDQW¶V GDQJHURXVQHVV DQG WKH ³KRUULILF QDWXUH´ RI WKH RIIHQVH WKHUH ZDV ³QR VXEVWDQWLDO
likelihood that the outcome of the punishment phase would have been altered by evidence that [the 
GHIHQGDQW@VXIIHUHGRUJDQLFEUDLQGDPDJH´9DVTXH]Y7KDOHU)HG$SS¶[WK&LU
2010) (finding no prejudice where trial counsel failed to develop and present evidence of post-
traumatic stress disorderIHWDODOFRKROV\QGURPHDQGDERUGHUOLQH,4JLYHQ³RYHUZKHOPLQJHYLGHQFH
RIJXLOW´DQG WKH³EUXWDOLW\´RI WKHRIIHQVHClark v. Thaler, 673 F.3d 410, 421±25 (5th Cir. 2012)
GHVFULELQJ WKH DJJUDYDWLQJ HYLGHQFH LQ WKH FDVH DV RYHUZKHOPLQJ WKXV PDNLQJ LW ³YLUWXDOO\
LPSRVVLEOHWRHVWDEOLVKSUHMXGLFH´XQGHU)LIWK&LUFXLWFDVHODZQRWZLWKVWDQGLQJH[WHQVLYHHYLGHQFHRI
childhood abuse and trauma) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Ladd v. Cockrell, 311 
)G   WK &LU  ILQGLQJ WKH IDLOXUH WR XQFRYHU DQG SUHVHQW HYLGHQFH RI /DGG¶V
diagnosis of mental retardation as a child as well as his harsh childhood insufficient to establish 
prejudice given his aggravated crimes); Hernandez v. Thaler, No. SA-08-CA-805-XR, 2011 WL 
DW:'7H[6HSWUHO\LQJRQWKHEUXWDOLW\RIWKHFULPHDQG³WKHODFNRIDQ\
HYLGHQFHRIJHQXLQHUHPRUVHRUVLQFHUHFRQWULWLRQLQWKHUHFRUG´EHIRUHWKH&RXUWDQGFRQFOXGLQJWKDW
³WKHUH LV QR UHDVRQDEOH SUREDELOLW\ WKDW EXW IRU WKH IDLOXUH RI SHWLWLRQHU¶V WULDO FRXQVHO WR SUHVHQW
HYLGHQFH RI SHWLWLRQHU¶V DEXVHG DQG GHSULYHG FKLOGKRRG WKH RXWFRPH RI WKH SXQLVKPHQW SKDVH RI
SHWLWLRQHU¶VWULDOZRXOGKDYHEHHQGLIIHUHQW´
98 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 776.
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FRQFHUQLQJ %XFN¶V FRQGXFW EXW WR UHQGHU D SUHGLFWLYH MXGJPHQW LQHYLWDEO\
HQWDLOLQJDGHJUHHRIVSHFXODWLRQ´99 Well, yes, and no.
After Furman, most state legislatures opted for the Model Penal Code system 
of a separate sentencing proceeding that requires the finding of a specified 
aggravating factor and then requires the jury to consider that factor along with 
mitigating factors; the constitutionality of this kind of system was upheld in Gregg 
v. Georgia.100 Texas took another path, passing a statute that required the jury to 
ILQG ZKHWKHU WKH PXUGHU ZDV FRPPLWWHG GHOLEHUDWHO\ ZKHWKHU WKH GHIHQGDQW¶V
conduct was unreasonable in response to any provocation by the victim, and 
³ZKHWKHU WKH HYLGHQFH HVWDEOLVKHG EH\RQG D UHDVRQDEOH GRXEW that there was a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would 
FRQVWLWXWHDFRQWLQXLQJWKUHDWWRVRFLHW\´101 The Court upheld the Texas statutory 
VFKHPH EHFDXVH LW ³JXLGHV DQG IRFXVHV WKH MXU\¶V REMHFWLYH FRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI the 
particularized circumstances of the individual offense and the individual offender 
EHIRUH LW FDQ LPSRVHDVHQWHQFHRIGHDWK´102 Texas is one of the few states that 
organize imposition of the death penalty around future dangerousness.103
But though the future dangerousness statutory scheme is unusual, the future 
dangerousness inquiry is not.  Texas has executed 543 defendants since 1976, and 
247 individuals now sit on death row in Texas.104 The Supreme Court has had 
many run-ins with future dangerousness before, and despite the salience of its 
failings as a method of selection, the Court has nonetheless upheld it.
As the brief of amici curiae National Association of Criminal Defense 
Lawyers and Texas Criminal Defense Lawyers Association in support of reversal 
sets forth in some detail, the Supreme Court has spent decades trying to get Texas 
and the Fifth Circuit to graft established, constitutionally required mitigation 
principles onto the Texas statutory scheme.105 I am, however, here not so much 
interested in the melding of future dangerousness and mitigation as in the concept 
of future dangerousness itself.  In theory, at least, Texas could have embraced a 
system that required a determination of future dangerousness, followed by a 

99 Id.
100 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S 153, 155 (1976).
101 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 267±68 (1976); see also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC., art. 37.071 
(2017).
102 Jurek, 428 U.S. at 274.
103 Robert Clary, Texas’s Capital-Sentencing Procedure Has a Simmons Problem: Its Gag 
Statute and 12-10 Rule Distort the Jury’s Assessment of the Defendant’s “Future Dangerousness,”
54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 57, 114±15 (2017).
104 DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, State by State Database: Texas, https://death
penaltyinfo.org/state_by_state [https://perma.cc/5PZB-QJRJ] (last visited Sept. 13, 2017) (showing 
that although both death sentences and executions have fallen in recent years, five men have been 
executed in Texas in 2017, and six more are scheduled for execution).
105 See %ULHIIRU1DW¶O$VV¶QRI&ULPLQDO'HI/DZ\HUV	7H[DV&ULPLQDO'HI/DZ\HUV$VV¶Q
as Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal at 12±19, Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759 (2017) (No. 15-
8049).
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weighing of the evidence of future dangerousness against whatever evidence of 
mitigation the defendant offered.  That it did so only after a long struggle says 
much about recalcitrance in the Texas state courts and the Fifth Circuit but not so 
much about the concept of future dangerousness.
But future dangerousness, at least as it has played out in Texas death penalty 
FDVHV LV LQWHOOHFWXDOO\ LQGHIHQVLEOH 0RUHRYHU LW LVQRWMXVWDFXULRXVO\³XQXVXDO
LQTXLU\´EXWRQHIRUZKLFK WKH6XSUHPH&RXUWLWVHOIEHDUV UHVSRQVLELOLW\ LWVFDVe
law has aggravated the risk of error and caprice in the future dangerousness 
determination.106 Barefoot v. Estelle challenged the admissibility of psychiatric 
predictions of future dangerousness on three grounds: First, that psychiatrists are 
incompetent to predict with an acceptable degree of probability that a particular 
individual will commit crimes in the future; second, that in any event, they should 
never be allowed to respond to hypothetical questions without having personally 
examined the defendant; and finally, that at the very least, the testimony by Dr. 
Grigson violated due process under the particular circumstances of the case.107
Despite the fact that the American Psychiatric Association as amicus curiae 
LQIRUPHGWKH&RXUWWKDW³XQUHOLDELOLW\RIpsychiatric predictions of long-term future 
GDQJHURXVQHVVLVDQHVWDEOLVKHGIDFWZLWKLQWKHSURIHVVLRQ´DQGWKDWtwo out of 
three predictions of future violence by psychiatrists are wrong,108 the Supreme 
Court upheld the admissibility of psychiatric predictions, reasoning that jurors 
were capable of evaluating their shortcomings.109 Although the APA had also 
GHWHUPLQHG WKDW LW LV ³XQHWKLFDO IRU D SV\FKLDWULVW WR RIIHU D SURIHVVLRQDO RSLQLRQ
XQOHVVKHVKHKDVFRQGXFWHGDQH[DPLQDWLRQ´110 the Barefoot majority declined to 
prohibit it, relying upon the use of hypothetical questions by experts in other 
disciplines.  Finally, though neither the State of Texas nor the Court could cite a 
single source contradicting the conclusion that psychiatrists predicting future 
dangerousness are wrong more often than they are right, the Court upheld the 
DGPLVVLRQ RI WHVWLPRQ\ E\ 'U *ULJVRQ WKDW KH ZDV ³one hundred percent and 
absolute´FHUWDLQWKDW%DUHIRRWZRXOGFRPPLWIXWXUHDFWVRIYLROHQFH111
Justice Blackmun, then still a middle-of-the-road supporter of the death 
penalty, wrote a furious dissent.  After reviewing the relevant professional 
OLWHUDWXUH KH FRQFOXGHG WKDW ³>X@OWLPDWHO\ ZKHQ WKH &RXUW NQRZV IXOO ZHOO WKDW
SV\FKLDWULVWV¶SUHGLFWLRQVRIGDQJHURXVQHVVDUHVSHFLous, there can be no excuse for 

106 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 776.
107 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983).
108 Id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 898±99 (majority opinion).
110 Id. at 923 n.6 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, WITH 
ANNOTATIONS ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 7(3), 9 (1981)).
111 Id. at 919.
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imposing on the defendant, on pain of his life, the heavy burden of convincing a 
MXU\RIOD\PHQRIWKHIUDXG´ 112
%ODFNPXQ¶V GLVVHQW ZULWWHQ D WKLUG RI D century ago, still accurately 
characterizes the state of the research on predictions of future dangerousness.  In 
addition, since then, Barefoot researchers have adduced evidence in the capital 
sentencing context that corroborates the general research on future dangerousness 
predictions available when Barefoot was decided.  Multiple studies reveal that the 
rates of serious institutional violence among capital offenders is quite low.113 For
example, one study followed the 558 former death row inmates whose sentences 
were commuted by Furman for 15 years; it found that less than eight percent of 
them committed acts of serious violence after their commutation and that seventy 
percent of them had no serious institutional infractions at all.114 Another study 
followed 421 Texas death row inmates for fifteen years beginning in 1974 and 
found that less only about ten percent engaged in assaultive acts.115 Thus, the base 
rate of violent offenses in the death row population is low.  Moreover, the most 
accurate probability is the base rate in the corresponding group to which the 
individual belongs;116 DGMXVWLQJ D ULVN RI YLROHQFH IURP WKH JURXS¶V EDVH UDWH
decreases rather than increases the accuracy of a prediction.117
$ PRUH UHFHQW VWXG\ VSHFLILFDOO\ H[DPLQHV WKH DFFXUDF\ RI H[SHUWV¶ IXWXUH
dangerousness predictions in Texas capital cases.  That study followed 155 capital 
cases where expert witnesses had predicted that the defendant would be a future 
danger; the experts were wrong in ninety-five percent of those predictions.118
Probably the most notorious error was that of Dr. Grigson in the Randall Dale 
Adams case, captured in the 1988 movie The Thin Blue Line.119 Grigson, who had 
PHW ZLWK $GDPV IRU  PLQXWHV WROG WKH MXU\ WKDW ³UHJDUGLQJ $GDPV¶V IXWXUH

112 Id. at 935±36; see also, Diane Wells, Criminal Law: Federal Habeas Corpus and the Death 
Penalty: A Need for a Return to the Principles of Furman, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 427, 428 
(1989) (criticizing Barefoot as being among the cases that hDYHFDXVHG³WKHFurman precept [to] in 
practice, if not in theory . . . shrink to a mere formality); Raymond J. Pascucci et al., Capital 
Punishment in 1984: Abandoning the Pursuit of Fairness and Consistency, 69 CORNELL L. REV.
1129, 1138 (1984) (with its decision in Barefoot ³WKH &RXUW KDV SDYHG WKH ZD\ IRU SURFHGXUDO
VFKHPHV WKDWYLRODWH WKHHLJKWKDQG IRXUWHHQWKDPHQGPHQWV¶GHPDQG IRU IDLU DQGFRQVLVWHQWFDSLWDO
VHQWHQFLQJGHFLVLRQV´
113 Jaymes Fairfax-Columbo & David DeMatteo, Reducing the Dangers of Future 
Dangerousness Testimony: Applying the Federal Rules of Evidence to Capital Sentencing, 25 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1047, 1059 (2017) (reviewing the literature).
114 James W. Marquart & Jonathan R. Sorensen, A National Study of the Furman-Commuted 
Inmates: Assessing the Threat to Society from Capital Offenders, 23 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 5, 20±21
(1989).
115 JAMES W. MARQUART ET AL., THE ROPE, THE CHAIR, AND THE NEEDLE: CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS, 1923-1990, at 179 (1994).
116 MARK D. CUNNINGHAM, EVALUATION FOR CAPITAL SENTENCING 68±69 (2010).
117 Id. at 69.
118 TEX. DEF. SERV., DEADLY SPECULATION: MISLEADING TEXAS CAPITAL JURIES WITH FALSE 
PREDICTIONS OF FUTURE DANGEROUSNESS 22, 34 (2004), http://texasdefender.org/wp-content
/uploads/TDS_Deadly-Speculation.pdf [https://perma.cc/6UZ6-L4JS].
119 THE THIN BLUE LINE (American Playhouse et al. 1988). 
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GDQJHURXVQHVVKHµZRXOGSODFH>$GDPV@DWWKHYHU\H[WUHPHZRUVHRUVHYHUHHQG
RIWKHVFDOH¶DQGWKDWµ>W@KHUHLVQRWKLQJLQWKHZRUOGWRGD\WKDWLVJRLQJWRFKDQJH
WKLV PDQ¶´120 Ironically, documentary producer Errol Morris originally had 
intended to produce a program focused upon Grigson, but upon interviewing 
Adams, became convinced of his innoFHQFH DQG XOWLPDWHO\ DVVLVWHG LQ $GDPV¶
exoneration.121 Not only was Adams innocent; during his twelve years of 
incarceration, Adams was never violent, or even involved in a disciplinary 
infraction.122
,QWHUHVWLQJO\ 'XDQH %XFN¶V SULVRQ UHFRUG DOVR HFKRHV WKe complete 
unreliability of future dangerousness determinations.  It has been nothing short of 
exemplary; he has had not a single disciplinary write-up during his fourteen years 
in prison, despite being incarcerated in a system where prisoners are regularly
SXQLVKHG IRU VXFK PLQRU ³RIIHQVHV´ DV UHIXVLQJ WR VKDYH RU KDYLQJ WRR PDQ\
stamps.123 Thus, it is not only the influence of race in the determination of Duane 
%XFN¶V GHDWKZRUWKLQHVV WKDW LV DEKRUUHQW LW LV DOVR WKH FRPSOHWH XQUHOLDELOLW\ RI
that determination, an unreliability sanctioned by the Supreme Court itself in 
Barefoot.
The majority opinion at no point acknowledges these pervasive problems with 
future dangerousness determinations, or its own responsibility for their exacerbated 
unreliability.
C. Race
A very large number of things have been said about race in capital cases, and 
I myself have said many of them.  Reams of empirical studies establish the 
influence of race in capital cases.124 Moreover, every time I look at a new slice of 
capital litigation²for example, intellectual disability determinations in capital 
cases,125 or juvenile executions,126 or the role of empathy in capital sentencing127²

120 Fairfax-Columbo, supra note 113, at 1049 (citations omitted).
121 Id. at 1050.
122 Id.
123 NAACP LDF, DUANE BUCK: SENTENCED TO DEATH BECAUSE HE IS BLACK (Dec. 5, 2012), 
http://www.naacpldf.org/case-issue/duane-buck-sentenced-death-because-he-black [https://perma.cc/
4RSF-2DKH].
124 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH INDICATES 
PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 6 (1990); John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn 
Johnson, Post-McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1771, 
1773±74 (1998).
125 Sheri Lynn Johnson, A Legal Obituary for Ramiro, 50 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 291 (2017).
126 Sheri Lynn Johnson, John H. Blume & Hannah L. Freedman, The Pre-Furman Juvenile 
Death Penalty in South Carolina: Young Black Life Was Cheap, 68 S.C. L. REV. 331, 334 (2017).
127 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Amelia Courtney Hritz, Caisa Elizabeth Royer & John H. Blume, 
When Empathy Bites Back: Cautionary Tales from Neuroscience for Capital Sentencing, 85 
FORDHAM L. REV. 573, 574 (2016).
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I run smack into race again.  Its presence is ubiquitous,128 and, in my view, for an 
obvious reason: Sentencing a person to death requires dehumanizing that person, 
and in this country, race has been the historically tested, surest road to 
dehumanization.
But my focus here is narrow: the flaws in the Buck opinions related to race.  I 
note three: asserting that explicit bias is unusual; pretending that the Court is 
committed to rooting out racial bias whenever it occurs; and ignoring the inevitable 
influence of race on determinations of future dangerousness whether or not 
someone articulates or argues race as a factor to consider.  I address them in 
DVFHQGLQJRUGHURIWKHGHJUHHRIP\GLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKH&RXUW¶VSUHPLVHV
³([WUDRUGLQDU\´%LDV
The majority at various junctures and in various ways characterizes this case 
as extraordinary.  After describing QuijDQR¶V WHVWLPRQ\ DV ³DSSHDO>LQJ@ WR D
powerful racial stereotype²WKDWRIEODFNPHQDVµYLROHQFHSURQH¶´LQWKHFRQWH[W
RIDIXWXUHGDQJHURXVQHVVGHWHUPLQDWLRQLWDVVHUWVWKDWWKLV³FUHDWHGVRPHWKLQJRID
SHUIHFW VWRUP´ ZKHUH ³>W@KH HIIHFW RI WKLV XQXVXDO confluence of factors was to 
SURYLGHVXSSRUWIRUPDNLQJDGHFLVLRQRQOLIHRUGHDWKRQWKHEDVLVRIUDFH´129 It 
FDVWLJDWHV WKHGLVWULFWFRXUW IRUGLVPLVVLQJ WZR UHIHUHQFHV WRUDFHDV³GHPLQLQLV´
EHFDXVH DQ\ PHQWLRQ RI UDFH FRQVWLWXWHV ³D GLVWXUELQJ GHSDUture from a basic 
SUHPLVHRIRXUFULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHP´130 7KHQLWHQGRUVHVWKHSHWLWLRQHU¶VEULHI¶V
DVVHUWLRQ WKDW ³>L@W VWUHWFKHV FUHGXOLW\ WR FKDUDFWHUL]H 0U %XFN¶V >LQHIIHFWLYH
assistance of counsel] claim as run-of-the-PLOO´131 Finally, it points tR 7H[DV¶V
concession in Saldano and five other Quijano testimony cases as demonstrating 
³>W@KH H[WUDRUGLQDU\QDWXUHRI WKLV FDVH´132 Thomas, in dissent, is also happy to 
QRWHWKDW³WKHPDMRULW\¶VVLQJOH-minded focus on according relief to this petitioner 
on these IDFWV QDWXUDOO\ OLPLWV WKH UHDFK RI LWV GHFLVLRQ´ JLYHQ WKDW ³WKH IDFWV
SUHVHQWHGKHUHDUHXQOLNHO\WRDULVHDJDLQ´133
,VLWXQXVXDOWRKDYH³H[SUHVVO\UDFLDO´134 references to race in a capital case?  

128 David A. Love, The Racial Bias of the US Death Penalty, GUARDIAN (Jan. 3, 2012, 3:33 
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/cifamerica/2012/jan/03/racial-bias-us-death-
penalty [https://perma.cc/BM7H-)56:@ ³>5@DFH DQG FDSLWDO SXQLVKPHQW LQ WKH 86 KDYH DOZD\V
been inseparable.  According to the Washington-based Death Penalty Information Center (DPIC), 
56% of death row inmates are black or Hispanic.  However, although racial minorities comprise half 
of all murder victims nationwide, a far greater proportion (77%) of the victims in capital convictions 
were white.  The racial identity of the murder victim is thus a leading factor in determining who 
UHFHLYHVDGHDWKVHQWHQFHLQ$PHULFD´
129 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 776 (2017).
130 Id. at 778.
131 Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
132 Id.
133 Id. at 785 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (emphasis in original).
134 Id.
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0D\EH&HUWDLQO\%XFN¶VFODLPWKDWWKLVZDVQRW D³UXQ-of-the-PLOO´,$&FODLPLV
IDLU%XW³H[WUDRUGLQDU\´"1R$ORQJZLWKFROOHDJXHV,H[DPLQHGFULPLQDOFDVHV
from the first decade of this century for the presence of racial epithets.135 We 
found five cases (four of them capital) where defense counsel used a racial epithet 
in speaking of a client.136 Relatedly, we found nine cases (three capital) where 
jurors used a racial epithet, either in the course of jury deliberations or in 
describing the defendant,137 one capital case in which a witness did so in the course 
of the trial,138 (not counting cases where the witness was testifying as to someone 
HOVH¶VUHPDUNVDQGWKUHHFDVHVDOOFDSLWDOZKHUHSURVHFXWRUVXVHGDUDFLDOHSLWKHW
to describe a defendant.139 Considering that racial epithets are a much narrower 
category than are explicit references to race, I am sure what we found substantially 
underestimates the category of express references to race in the course of capital or 
RWKHUFULPLQDOSURFHHGLQJV7KXVH[SUHVVUHIHUHQFHVDUHKDUGO\³H[WUDRUGLQDU\´
Of course, if the courts were truly committed to eradicating the influence 
express racial references whenever they occur, then the characterization of express 
references as extraordinary would not much matter.  But as discussed below, they 
have not been.
2. The Commitment to Eradicating the Influence of Race
A claim of commitment to the eradication of racial bias in capital sentencing 
LVLPSOLFLWERWKLQWKHPDMRULW\¶VLQVLVWHQFHWKDWWKLVLVDQH[WUDRUGLQDU\FDVHDQGLQ
its characterization of the possLELOLW\³WKDW%XFNPD\KDYHEHHQVHQWHQFHGWRGHDWK
LQSDUWEHFDXVHRIKLVUDFH´DV³DGLVWXUELQJGHSDUWXUHIURPDEDVLFSUHPLVHRIRXU
criminal justice system: Our law punishes people for what they do, not who they 
DUH´140 The opinion then proclaims that ³>G@LVFULPLQDWLRQ RQ WKH EDVLV RI UDFH
RGLRXV LQ DOO DVSHFWV LV HVSHFLDOO\ SHUQLFLRXV LQ WKH DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ RI MXVWLFH´
EHFDXVHLW³µSRLVRQVSXEOLFFRQILGHQFH¶LQWKHMXGLFLDOSURFHVV´DVZHOODVLQMXUHV
the defendant.141

135 Sheri Lynn Johnson, John H. Blume & Patrick M. Wilson, Racial Epithets in the Criminal 
Process, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 755 (2011).
136 Id. at 768±72.
137 Id. at 759±68.
138 Id. at 772.
139 Id. at 773±74.
140 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 778 (2017).
141 Id. (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 
$VWURQJFRPPLWPHQWPLJKWDOVREHLQIHUUHGIURPWKHPDMRULW\¶VGHFLVLRQWRGHFOLQHWR
UHDFKWKHUHWURDFWLYLW\TXHVWLRQIRULWGHFODUHVWKDWHQWHUWDLQLQJWKH6WDWH¶VDUJXPHQW that Martinez is
QRW UHWURDFWLYHZRXOG LQVXODWHIURPFRQVLGHUDWLRQ³WKH LVVXHVZHWKRXJKWZRUWK\RIUHYLHZ´  Id. at 
780.  However, I think the decision to put aside the retroactivity question might better be thought of 
DVEDODQFLQJ WKH&RXUW¶V GHVLUH WRhedge regarding the strength of its commitment future Martinez 
FODLPDQWVZLWKDV-XVWLFH7KRPDVVD\VLWV³VLQJOH-minded focus on according relief to this petitioner 
on these IDFWV´Id. at 785 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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There is, of course, some evidence that the courts care about racial 
discrimination in criminal cases.  Buck is some evidence.  Batson v. Kentucky is 
some evidence,142 DQG VR LV WKH &RXUW¶V UHFHQW GHFLVLRQ LQ Pena-Rodriguez v. 
Colorado.143 But what about McCleskey v. Kemp,144 or Turner v. Murray?145 Even 
with respect to explicit references to race, the cases suggest less than enthusiastic 
HQIRUFHPHQWRIWKHODXGDEOH³EDVLFSUHPLVH´DVP\UHYLHZRIWKHHLJKWHHQUDFLDO
epithet cases revealed that relief²of any sort, even a remand for factual findings²
was granted in only five.146 Moreover, relief was not granted in even one of the 
cases involving the use of racial epithets by defense counsel or prosecutors.
%XWLWLVQRWQHFHVVDU\WRVWUD\WKDWIDUWRUHYHDOWKHVKDOORZQHVVRIWKH&RXUW¶V
FRPPLWPHQWWR³WKHEDVLFSUHPLVH´WKDW³>R@XUODZSXQLVKHVSHRSOHIRUZKDWWKH\
GRQRWZKRWKH\DUH´147 We need only look to two of the other Quijano testimony 
FDVHV 0RVWREYLRXVO\ WKHUH LV%XFN¶VRZQ ILUVW YHQWXUH WR WKH6XSUHPH&RXUW
Three years before he sought to reopen his case to allege the ineffective assistance 
of trial counsel in 2014, Buck sought to reopen his case with another claim: that 
the prosecution had violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses by 
asking Dr. Quijano about the relationship between race and future violence on 
cross-examination and referring to his testimony during summation.  The Fifth 
Circuit disagreed,148 and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.149 The majority 
opinion notes this denied petition for certiorari in its recitation of the procedural 
history of the case with no comment.150 But if the mention of race cannot be 
GLVPLVVHG DV ³GH PLQLQLV´ ZK\ ZDV a majority of the Court indifferent to the 
SURVHFXWLRQ¶V additional and more invidious reference to race?  As Justice 
6RWRPD\RU¶V GLVVHQW IURP WKH GHQLDO RI FHUWLRUDUL SRLQWHG RXW WKH SURVHFXWRU¶V

142 Baston v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79³3XUSRVHIXOUDFLDOGLVFULPLQDWLRQLQVHOHFWLRQ
RIWKHYHQLUHYLRODWHVDGHIHQGDQW¶VULJKWWRHTXDOSURWHFWLRQEHFDXVHLWGHQLHVKLPWKHSURWHFWLRQWKDW
DWULDOE\MXU\LVLQWHQGHGWRVHFXUH´but see Sheri Lynn Johnson, Batson from the Very Bottom of 
the Well: Critical Race Theory and the Supreme Court’s Peremptory Challenge Jurisprudence, 12 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L    ³0RUH WKDQ D TXDUWHU RI D century of peremptory challenge 
jurisprudence suggests that most of the time, most of the 6XSUHPH&RXUWLVDPRQJWKRVHZKRµVLPSO\
ZDWFKPHVPHUL]HGLQWRPDLQWDLQLQJWKHLUXQVSRNHQFRPPLWPHQWWRNHHSLQJXVZKHUHZHDUH¶´
143 Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S.Ct. 855 (2017).
144 0F&OHVNH\Y.HPS86³(YHQ3URIHVVRU%DOGXVdoes not contend 
that his statistics prove that race enters into any capital sentencing decisions or that race was a factor 
LQ0F&OHVNH\¶VSDUWLFXODUFDVH´
145 Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986) (Affording only capital defendants accused of 
interracial crimes the right to have prospective jurors informed of the race of the victim and 
questioned on the issue of racial bias).
146 Johnson, supra note 135, at 759.
147 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 778 (2017).
148 Buck v. Thaler, )$SS¶[±28 (5th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).
149 Buck v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 1022 (2011).
150 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. at 771.
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question about race was not simply a repetition of defensHFRXQVHO¶V151 On direct 
examination, Quijano merely identified race as one statistical factor and pointed 
out the overrepresentation of African Americans in the criminal justice system; he 
neither stated a causal relationship, nor linked this statistic to Buck as an 
LQGLYLGXDO  ³%XW >WKH SURVHFXWRU@ GLG LQ D TXHVWLRQ VSHFLILFDOO\ GHVLJQHG WR
SHUVXDGHWKHMXU\WKDW%XFN¶VUDFHPDGHKLPmore dangerous and that, in part on 
WKLVEDVLVKHVKRXOGEHVHQWHQFHGWRGHDWK´152
One has to wonder how a Court genuinely committed to eradicating the 
influence of racial bias on capital sentencing could have been uninterested in 
Duane Buck the first time around, particularly since the majority reasoning 
LQFOXGHV WKDW ³>U@HO\LQJ RQ UDFH WR LPSRVH D FULPLQDO VDQFWLRQ µSRLVRQs public 
FRQILGHQFH¶LQWKHMXGLFLDOSURFHVV´FHUWDLQO\³SXEOLFFRQILGHQFH´LVPRUHHURGHG
by the State’s reliance on race WKDQ LW LVE\ WKHGHIHQVH¶V UHIHUHQFH WR LW153 The 
reader who optimistically wonders if the Court might have been anticipating that 
Buck would be back with an ineffective assistance of counsel claim should know 
that his return could not be anticipated, given that Martinez, which provided the 
SURFHGXUDOYHKLFOHIRUKLVPRWLRQKDGQRWEHHQGHFLGHGE\WKHWLPH%XFN¶V
first petition was denied.
Moreover, after Saldano, Texas Attorney General Cornyn identified eight 
FDVHVDVLQYROYLQJVLPLODUWHVWLPRQ\E\4XLMDQREXWGLVPLVVHGWZRDV³GLVVLPLODU
to the Saldano case [because in] one, the defendant was not a member of a racial 
group incOXGHGLQ'U4XLMDQR¶VVWDWLVWLFDOPRGHO>DQGLQ@WKHRWKHUWKHSURVHFXWLRQ
GLGQRWLQWURGXFHUDFHDVDIDFWRU´154 ³7KHRWKHU´FDVHZDV WKDWRI-XDQ*DUFLD
DQG 4XLMDQR¶V WHVWLPRQ\ RQ GLUHFW LQ WKDW FDVH ZDV YLUWXDOO\ LGHQWLFDO WR KLV
testimony on direct in Buck.155 Garcia raised ineffective assistance of counsel on 
his direct appeal, but the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the denial of 
KLV SHWLWLRQ EHFDXVH LW UHDVRQHG WKDW KH KDG IDLOHG WR GHPRQVWUDWH WKDW FRXQVHO¶V
decision to call Quijano was not a valid strategy.156 This decision was upheld on 

151 Buck v. Thaler, )$SS¶[DW6RWRPD\RU-GLVVHQWLQJ
152 Id.
153 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. at 766 (citing Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208 (2015)).
154 OFFICE OF THE TEXAS ATTORNEY GENERAL, STATEMENT FROM ATTORNEY GENERAL JOHN 
CORNYN REGARDING DEATH PENALTY CASES, (June 9, 2000), https://texasattorneygeneral.gov/
newspubs/newsarchive/2000/20000609death.htm [https://perma.cc/5WUF-FWQV].
155 Garcia Y6WDWH 6:G  ³4:KDW DERXWZKHWKHU RUQRW VRPHRQH LV
black, white, Hispanic?  Does that play a role?  A: The race plays a role in that the²among 
dangerous people, minority people are overrepresented in this population.  And, so, blacks and 
Hispanics are overrepresented in the²in the dangerous-so-FDOOHGGDQJHURXVSRSXODWLRQ´
156 Id. at 440±³&RXQVHOPLJKWKDYHEHHQDWWHPSWLQJZLWK4XLMDQR¶VWHVWLPRQ\WRGRWZR
WKLQJV ௗ SODFH EHIRUH WKH MXU\ DOO WKH IDFWRUV LW PLJKW XVH DJDLQVW DSSHOODQW HLWKHU SURSHUO\ RU
improperly, in its assessment of his future dangerousness and (2) persuade the jury that, despite all 
those negative factors, appellant would not be a future danger if imprisoned for life because the 
SULVRQV\VWHP¶VSURFHGXUHVDQGWHFKQLTXHVZRXOGFRQWURORUHOLPLQDWHKLVWHQGHQF\WRZDUGYLROHQFH
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the merits in federal district court on habeas corpus,157 and the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals denied a COA on the issue.158 The Supreme Court denied certiorari,159
and Garcia was executed in October 2015.160 What would distinguish Garcia?
Procedurally, it would have been much easier, for there was no arguable default in 
state court, no need for Martinez, and no need to satisfy Rule 60(b)(6).  There just 
was not as much publicity.
3. Silent Prejudice
I have QRGLIILFXOW\ZLWK WKH&RXUW¶V FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW WKHUHZDV D VLJQLILFDQW
FKDQFH WKDW%XFN¶V VHQWHQFLQJZDV LQIOXHQFHG E\ UDFH  ,WV FODLP WKDW WKH UDFLDO
VWHUHRW\SH RI EODFN PHQ DV ³YLROHQFH SURQH´ LV SRZHUIXO DQG ZDV QRW GLVSXWHG
because it really cannot be.161 Moreover, the literature cited in the amicus briefs 
resolves all doubt; anyone who reads them will be convinced by the overwhelming 
HPSLULFDO DQG KLVWRULFDO HYLGHQFH WKH\ FLWH GRFXPHQWLQJ WKH VWHUHRW\SH¶V XJO\
pervasiveness.162 Nor can one reasonably doXEW WKH &RXUW¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW WKH
stereotype of crime-prone, violence-prone African Americans (and Latinos) 
³FRLQFLGHGSUHFLVHO\ZLWKWKHFHQWUDOTXHVWLRQDWVHQWHQFLQJ´163
7KHSUREOHPLVLQGHWHUPLQLQJZKHWKHUWKHMXU\ZDVLQIOXHQFHGE\4XLMDQR¶V
testimony significantly more than they would have been by unarticulated racial 
stereotypes.  Although the amicus briefs take pains to establish that stereotypes are 
easily triggered²thereby demonstrating that the district court was wrong in 
GLVPLVVLQJ 4XLMDQR¶V WHVWLPRQ\ DV ³GH PLQLPLV´164²they do not address the 
likelihood of triggering those same stereotypes absent explicit reference to race.  
But more generally, the related cognitive psychology literature establishes that 
whether a schema²such as a racial stereotype²is accessible to an individual 
depends upon both salience and priming.165 It is true that the salience of a 

Under the circumstances²the State had already presented evidence before the jury that appellant had 
a long and violent criminal record²ZHFDQQRW VD\ WKDW FRXQVHO¶V FRQGXFW FRXOGQRW EH FRQVLGHUHG
VRXQGWULDOVWUDWHJ\´
157 Garcia v. Stephens, No. H-08-2929, 2013 WL 12100443 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 2013).
158 Garcia v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 220 (5th Cir. 2014).
159 Garcia v. Stephens, 135 S. Ct. 1492 (2015).
160 Texas Executes Juan Martin Garcia for Murder in $8 Robbery, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2015, 
10:16 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/07/texas-executes-juan-martin-garcia-over-
8-robbery-and [https://perma.cc/XHP5-45BV].
161 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 776 (2017).
162 SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 48.
163 Buck, 137 S. Ct. at 776.
164 See Brief of Constitutional Accountability Center as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner at 31, Buck, 137 S. Ct. 759 (No. 15-8049).
165 Sheri Lynn Johnson, Litigating for Racial Fairness After McCleskey v. Kemp, 39 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 178, 196±97 (2007) (citing THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 408
(2006)).
2017] BUCK V. DAVIS FROM THE LEFT 269
stereotype is increased by overt reference to that stereotype, but it is also true that 
the salience of the race of a black or Latino defendant is usually quite high, both 
because the salience of race in our culture is generally high, and because the 
GHIHQGDQW¶V UDFH W\SLFDOO\ FRQWUDVWV ZLWK WKDW RI KLV ODZ\HUV WKH MXGJH DQG WKH
jury.166 0RUHLPSRUWDQWO\KRZHYHUDVFKHPDLV WULJJHUHG³ZKHQLW LVprimed by 
RWKHUVWDWHPHQWVRULQIRUPDWLRQSUHVHQWHG´167 While statistics might additionally 
prime the violence stereotype, the far more powerful prime is the crime with which 
the defendant is accused, which in all capital cases, is a crime of violence.168
Moreover, the statistical study of capital sentences in Harris County proffered by 
%XFN¶VODZ\HUVRIIHUVIXUWKHUDOEHLWLQGLUHFWVXSSRUWIRUWKHSURSRVLWLRQWKDWIXWXUH
dangerousness determinations, looked at as a whole (and not just those involving 
explicit references to race), are influenced by race; among a group of cases 
FRPSDUDEOH WR %XFN¶V DQG FRQWUROOLQJ IRU RWKHU IDFWRUV UHVHDUFKHUV IRXQG WKDW
juries were 1.3 times as likely to impose a death sentence on a black defendant as 
on a white defendant, and 1.7 times more likely to impose a death sentence upon a 
Latino defendant as upon a white defendant.169
Thus, considering the evidence from cognitive and social psychology, and the 
GDWDIURP+DUULV&RXQW\LWLVDSSDUHQWWKDWWKHHIIHFWRIWKH³FRQIOXHQFH RIIDFWRUV´
of the race of defendants of color and the inquiry of future dangerousness, with or 
without explicit mention of race, risks infecting the death selection decision with 
racial bias.  Or to put it in the Court’s language, it is the future dangerousness 
inquiry itself, not the testimony of Dr. Quijano, that ³SURYLGH>V@VXSSRUWIRUPDNLQJ
DGHFLVLRQRQOLIHRUGHDWKRQWKHEDVLVRIUDFH´170
Why does the Court not acknowledge this?  In the end, we come once more 
back to colorblindness.171 If we do not say race, we speak no evil; and if we speak 
no evil, a majority of the Court not only hears no evil but refuses to see it.172

166 Id. at 197 (citing SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 145 (1991)).
167 Id. (emphasis in original).
168 Id.
169 RAY PATERNOSTER WITH SCOTT PHILLIPS, NAACP LDF, RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CASE OF 
DUANE EDWARD BUCK, (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.naacpldf.org/files/case_issue/Duane%20Buck-
FINAL%20Signed%20Paternoster%20Report%20(00032221).PDF [https://perma.cc/MP6R-L8E6].
170 Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 776 (2017).
171 Ian F. Haney López, “A Nation of Minorities”: Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary 
Colorblindness, 59 STAN. L. REV  ³&RORUEOLQGQHVV   SURWHFWVDQGYDOLGDWHVDV
µQRW-UDFLVP¶WKHDFWLRQVRILQWHQWLRQDOGLVFULPLQDWRUVZKRH[HUFLVHWKHVPDOOHVWPRGLFXPRIFDXWLRQ
as well as, much more significantly, the inertial persistence of entrenched patterns of racial 
KLHUDUFK\´ ,DQ +DQH\-López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1784 (2012) 
³>&@RORUEOLQGQHVVLJQRUHVWKHFKDQJHVZURXJKWE\WKHFLYLOULJKWVPRYHPHQWLWVHOIZKLFKPRYHGWKH
country from one seekiQJWRHQIRUFHUDFLDOVXSUHPDF\WRRQHKRSLQJIRULWVHUDGLFDWLRQ´
172 Here I do not mean the Buck majority, which includes some justices who, on some 
occasions, worry about unspoken bias.
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IV. CONCLUSION
%HFDXVHHDFKPDQ¶VGHDWKGLPLQLVKHVPH,DPKDSS\IRU'XDQH%XFNZKR
has now, by agreement with the Harris Count\'LVWULFW $WWRUQH\¶V 2IILFH EHHQ
resentenced to life in prison plus two terms of sixty years.173 And doubtless I 
would have despaired far more over an affirmance, for we are in an even worse 
place than I would have imagined if well-publicized overt racism in the imposition 
of the death penalty is tolerable.
But, what about Linda Carty²also represented by Guerinot, who conducted 
virtually no investigation in her case either174²whose future dangerousness was 
hard to fathom, given that her only crime was of a kind that could never be 
repeated in prison?175 What about all the defendants Dr. Grigson, or some equally 
FHUWDLQ³H[SHUW´KHOSHGVHQGWRWKHLUGHDWKVZLWKRXWDVKUHGRIVFLHQWLILFHYLGHQFH
supporting their conclusions?  And, finally, what about Victor Saldano and the five 
RWKHUGHIHQGDQWVZKRZHUHJUDQWHGQHZKHDULQJVEDVHGRQ4XLMDQR¶V WHVWLPRQ\"
All have now been resentenced to death.  Do we really think none of their 
resentencing proceedings were influenced by race?
Buck has no answers to any of these questions.

173 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY, HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS, BUCK GOES FROM DEATH 
ROW TO LIFE PLUS TWO 60 YEAR TERMS, (Oct. 3, 2017), http://app.dao.hctx.net/buck-goes-death-row-
life-plus-two-60-year-terms [https://perma.cc/8CH6-YNFH].
174 ,FDQ¶WKHOSEXWWKLQNRIP\RZQFOLHQW5DPLUR+HUQDQGH]/ODQDVZKRZDVH[HFXWHGE\
the State of Texas and whose lawyer did nothing to reveal the toxic waste dump he grew up on, the 
abuse he endured from his parents, or the intellectual disability that caused him to be thrown out of 
school in third grade as hopeless.  Johnson, supra note 125.  Virtually every death penalty lawyer I 
know has had a client represented so poorly that his client would have been just as well off with no 
counsel at all.
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